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Because intertemporal substitution of labor is a central element in most models used by
macroeconomists today (some version of the permanent-income hypothesis model with
capital market imperfections), much research has been devoted to examining whether it is
an important determinant of labor supply.1 If the intertemporal substitution is important
for labor-leisure choices, we would observe that individuals expecting increases in the real
wage work little today and more in the future. Using microdata on wages, hours worked
and various household characteristics, most studies however ﬁnd that expected changes in
the real wage only lead to small changes in hours worked. For men, most estimates of the
intertemporal labor-supply elasticity are in the range between 0 and 0.5 (see for example
Heckman and MaCurdy 1980, MaCurdy 1981, Altonji 1986, Blundell and MaCurdy 1999).
The microeconomic evidence thus suggests that a low elasticity should be used in
macroeconomic models. Browning et al. (1999), however, note that microeconomic esti-
mates often are incompatible with macroeconomic models. In this paper, we argue along
these lines that previous estimates of the labor-supply elasticity are indeed inconsistent
with macroeconomic models with incomplete markets. In particular, if the econometrician
ignores borrowing constraints, the elasticity will be biased downwards.2
The goal of this paper is to quantitatively assess this bias. We do this by ﬁrst applying
standard econometric methods on synthetic data generated from a macroeconomic model
in which we know the true labor-supply elasticity.3 We then estimate the elasticity using
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), with and without instruments
for borrowing constraints.
1 The classical article emphasizing the role of intertemporal labor supply is Lucas and Rapping (1969).
2 A large fraction of U.S. households hold virtually no wealth and many households do not even have
a bank or checking account (see Deaton 1991 and Diaz-Gimenez et al. 1997). It seems unlikely that
these households can use credit to smooth consumption. More direct evidence of liquidity constraints is
reported by Japelli (1990) who found that approximately 20 percent of U.S. households are constrained.
3 Guvenen (2000) use a similar method to argue that estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution are inconsistent with macroeconomic models, and that these estimates are biased downwards.
1In the next section, we introduce a model, developed by Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari
(1994). This model has become the workhorse tool for analyzing economies with incom-
plete markets and household heterogeneity. The economy is populated by a large number
of inﬁnitely-lived households that face uninsurable idiosyncratic wage risk, supply labor
elastically and trade a single asset. Each household can achieve a path for consumption
that is smoother than its path for labor income by adjusting its asset holdings and its
labor supply in response to wage shocks.
Households have an incentive to accumulate a buﬀer stock of savings when their labor
income is above average, since borrowing is ruled out by assumption. Because wage shocks
are uncorrelated across households, the distributions of income and wealth in the model
are endogenous.
Section 3 outlines the most important estimation procedures that have been applied in
the empirical literature. We also demonstrate how the presence of borrowing constraints
aﬀects the equations to be estimated, and why estimates of the elasticity may be downward
biased if borrowing constraints are ignored.
In Section 4, we report the results of using these econometric methods to estimate the
labor supply elasticity from data generated by the model. We ﬁnd that the downward bias
is around 50 percent. That is if the true labor supply elasticity is 1, the econometrician
would ﬁnd a value of 0.5.
In Section 5, we apply the same econometric methods on PSID data. We ﬁrst replicate
previous estimates of the labor-supply elasticity. We then show that if we control for
borrowing constraints, the estimates rise as theory suggests.
22 The model
Our economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households, endowed with
one unit of time which is divided between labor, h,a n dl e i s u r e ,l. Households choose





tu(ct,h t) ,( 1 )
where β is the subjective discount factor. Let at denote a household’s assets in the
beginning of period t. We assume that households are unable to borrow, i.e.,
at ≥ 0 .
Let rt denote the real return at date t t oo n eu n i to ft h ea s s e tp u r c h a s e da tt − 1 and let
w denote the real return to supplying one unit of eﬀective labor. The household’s budget
constraint in period t is then given by
ct + at+1 =( 1+rt)at + wtetht .( 2 )
where e denotes the household’s productivity, which evolves through time according to
a ﬁrst-order Markov chain. We normalize productivity to unity so that E(e)=1 . The
timing convention is that et is observed before decisions are made in period t,a n dw e
assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty.






where K and H denote the aggregate capital stock and the aggregate eﬀective labor
supply. Output can be transformed into future capital and consumption according to
Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt = Yt (4)
3where δ is the rate of depreciation. Product and factor markets are assumed to be com-





t − δ (5)
and





We focus on stationary equilibria only. See e.g. Aiyagari (1994) and Aiyagari and Mc-
Grattan (1998) for the precise deﬁnition of such equilibria. The most important features
of the equilibrium are that (i) factor prices are constant since there is no aggregate uncer-
tainty, (ii) decision rules for consumption and labor supply are time-invariant functions of
the household’s asset holdings and productivity, and (iii) aggregate savings and labor sup-
ply implied by the decision rules sum to the aggregate capital stock and aggregate labor
supply. Note also that although aggregates (including the distribution of households in
wage-wealth space) are constant, there are ﬂuctuations and uncertainty at the household
level.
2.1 Parameterization
The model period is one year. All parameter values used are reported in yearly terms
in table I. The parameters relating to aggregate production and preferences are set to
standard values. The capital share in the production function is 0.3 and the depreciation
rate is 0.075. The discount factor β is 0.95.
We assume that logged productivity follows an AR(1) process with ﬁxed eﬀects
loget = ψ + zt
zt = ρzt−1 + εt.
4Various authors have estimated similar stochastic processes for logged labor productivity
using data from the PSID. These processes can be summarized by ρ, σε,a n dσψ —t h es e r i a l
correlation coeﬃcient, the standard deviation of the innovation term ε, and the standard
deviation of ﬁxed eﬀects ψ, respectively. Allowing for the presence of measurement error
and the eﬀects of observable characteristics such as education and age, work by Card
(1991), Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), and Flodén and Lindé (1999) indicates a ρ
in the range 0.88 to 0.96, and a σε in the range 0.12 to 0.25.W ea d o p tt h ee s t i m a t e so f
Flodén and Lindé and use the parameter values {ρ,σε,σψ} = {0.90,0.21,0.34}.4
The utility function is speciﬁed below.
3 Estimation procedure
In this section we describe the standard estimation procedures used in the literature.5
These are based on ﬁrst order conditions for household optimization. Additional assump-
tions such as separability of the utility function or an explicit functional form for the
utility are then added in order to obtain equations that can be estimated.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the household’s utility maximization in this framework
are
uct = λt (6)
λtwet = −uht (7)
λt − φt =( 1+r)βEtλt+1 (8)
where λt is the marginal utility of wealth in period t and φt is the marginal utility of
borrowing in period t. In principle we can use these conditions to estimate the house-
hold’s willingness to intertemporally substitute. In practise, this may only be done if
4 When solving the model, we approximate the productivity process by a discrete Markov process
using seven grid points for z and two grid points for ψ.
5 See Blundell and MaCurdy 1999 for a more elaborate discussion.
5consumption and hours worked enter the instantaneous utility function in a tractable
way.
Before turning to the details of the estimation procedures, it is important to specify
exactly which labor-supply elasticity we intend to estimate. The Frisch (or constant
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This elasticity shows how labor supply responds to an intertemporal reallocation of
wages that leaves marginal utility of wealth unaﬀected. As Blundell and MaCurdy (1999,
p. 1595) point out, this ‘is the correct elasticity for assessing the impact of wage changes
through time on labor supply’.
3.1 Estimation with separable utility
To obtain tractable results, it is often assumed that utility is separable in consumption
and leisure, and this assumption has frequently been employed in the empirical literature.
As the starting point for our analysis, let us therefore assume that the instantaneous







.( 1 0 )
This speciﬁcation of the utility function is convenient since γ is the Frisch intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, which we aim to estimate. Further, µ is the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, and α is a parameter determining the level of labor supply.
6The ﬁrst order conditions can, as a ﬁrst order approximation, be rewritten into the
following log-linear equations
lnht = constant + γ [lnw +l net +l nλt] ,( 1 1 )
lnct = constant −
1
µ




=l nλt+1 +l nβ(1 + r) − ξt+1,( 1 3 )
where ξt+1 is the forecast error.
Let ∆xt+1 = xt+1 − xt. Equation (11) can then be written in ﬁrst diﬀerences,
∆lnht+1 = constant + γ∆lnet+1 −
γφt
λt
+ γξt+1.( 1 4 )
MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) estimate the Frisch intertemporal labor supply elas-
ticity by regressing the diﬀerence on log-wages on the diﬀerence in log-hours worked,
∆lnht+1 = constant + γ∆lnet+1 + γξt+1,( 1 5 )
which follows from their assumption of perfect capital markets.
Note that expected future wage increases are positively correlated with the marginal
utility of borrowing, φ, and uncorrelated with the marginal utility of wealth, λ, as long
as φ is non-zero. Consequently, the estimate of γ will be biased downwards if the term
−γφt/λt is ignored.
The error term, ξ, also includes an approximation error due to the log-linearization of
the ﬁrst order conditions. Ludvigson and Paxson (2001) show that these approximation
errors may cause substantial downward bias in estimates of other parameters derived from
the Euler equation. The log-linearization works particularly poorly when decision rules
are non-linear as they are in states where households are or are close to being borrowing
constrained, something which will make this bias larger. The Appendix contains a more
7detailed description of this bias and shows how we, in the simulated data, can separate
t h eb i a sf r o mo m i t t i n gφ/λ f r o mt h eb i a sd u et ot h el o g - l i n e a r i z a t i o n .
Even if we could ignore the liquidity constraints and the log-linearization bias, there
are econometrical obstacles to estimating (15). The error term ξ is correlated with the
explanatory variable ∆lne.6 Equation (15) is therefore estimated with instruments for the
productivity changes.7 To instrument for ∆lnet+1 in our synthetical framework we use the
mathematical expectation of ∆lnet+1 at time t, Et∆lnet+1, which contains all information
about the productivity change except what is contained in ξt+1. T h i sa p p r o a c hi sn o t
feasible when using real world data, since then the true productivity process is unknown
and the exact productivity levels, ﬁxed eﬀects, etc. are not observed.
Altonji used lagged wages and lagged wage changes to instrument for future wage
changes. Note that with our productivity process,
∆lnet+1 = zt+1 − zt =( ρ − 1)zt + εt+1 =( ρ − 1)(lnet − ψ)+εt+1 (16)
This equation shows that lnet is correlated with the productivity change. Obviously
lnet is uncorrelated with the error term ξt+1. A potential problem when using lnet as
the instrument is that it is correlated with the ﬁxed eﬀect ψ. This motivates, as is
sometimes done in the empirical literature, using additional household variables when
estimating (16). In our model framework the results are not sensitive to the choice of
instruments and we consequently only report results using the mathematical expectation.
When using real world data, we follow Altonji and use various combinations of lagged
wages and household characteristics.
An alternative procedure for estimating the elasticity is pursued in Altonji (1986). He
6 An exception is when households know their wage one period ahead, which is assumed by MaCurdy
and in some of Altonji’s speciﬁcations. In our model the only innovation between periods is the shock to
household productivity.
7 Another reason to instrument for ∆lne is the occurance of measurement errors. MaCurdy used year
dummies and individual speciﬁc information such as age and education as instruments. Altonji used two
diﬀerent wage series for each household.
8uses (12) to rewrite equation (11) in log-levels,
lnht = constant + γ lnet −
γ
µ
lnct ,( 1 7 )
and uses data on hours worked, wages, and food consumption to estimate γ.8 The ad-
vantage with this procedure is that borrowing constraints do not enter this equation.
H o w e v e r ,t h eu s eo fc o n s u m p t i o nd a t ai sp r o b l e m a t i c .I ti sd i ﬃcult to ﬁnd good micro-
data containing both total consumption and labor supply. The PSID, used by Altonji,
contains food consumption and income data, but using food consumption as a proxy
for total consumption requires that food consumption is suﬃciently separable from other
consumption goods in the utility function.
To handle participation constraints, some authors (e.g. Browning et al. 1985, and
Blundell et al. 1993, 1998) have estimated semi-log equations of the form9
∆ht+1 = constant + γ∆lnet+1 + εt+1.( 1 8 )
Again, a correlation between ∆lnet+1 and the error term is likely. We therefore instrument
for ∆lnet+1 using its mathematical expectation. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) point out
that this equation cannot be derived from any standard utility function. Furthermore, we
ﬁnd (see below) that this formulation performs poorly on the synthetic data.
3.2 Non-separable utility
The assumption that preferences are separable in consumption and leisure is generally
regarded as restrictive and possibly unrealistic. Quite naturally, therefore, attempts have
been made to allow for more general preferences in the empirical literature. Altonji
(1986) argues that adding cross-substitution terms to equations (11) and (12) results in
an approximation of the log-linearized ﬁrst order conditions. As long as measurement
8 Browning et al. (1999, section 3.2.2) discuss a similar approach.
9 The participation constraint is never binding with the utility function in equation (10).
9errors are negligible, the elasticity can still be estimated from the diﬀerence form (as in
equations 15 and 14). The log-level form (17) will, however, result in a biased estimate
of the labor-supply elasticity.
It is not clear what restrictions on preferences are needed for Altonji’s approximation to
be valid. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) indeed argue that estimating the Frisch elasticity
is not possible unless preferences are separable.
Unless a speciﬁc functional form for preferences is assumed, it will be diﬃcult to
further assess this issue. Let us therefore also consider the Cobb-Douglas utility function
that has been used frequently in the macroeconomic literature,
u(c,h)=
£




For this utility function, we can derive the intertemporal elasticity of leisure as
η
l =
1 − α(1 − µ)
µ
.
The Frisch elasticity, ηλ = 1−h
h ηl, then depends on each household’s labor supply. If
participation constraints and borrowing constraints are not binding, one can derive the
following relationships10






ln(1 − ht)=constant − lnet +l nct. (20)
If ∆lnht+1 i su s e do nt h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 1 9 ) ,t h e r ei sn or e a s o nt oe x p e c tt h a tt h e
Frisch elasticity for labor supply will be estimated. First, the change in log hours is not
identical to the negative of changes in log leisure. Further, even if that were the case,
the elasticity for leisure is diﬀerent from the Frisch elasticity. Equation (20) shows that
10 See the Appendix for the expressions with constraints.
10the log-level equation, even if estimated on leisure, is not related to the intertemporal
elasticity.
The straightforward approach for obtaining an estimate of the average labor supply
elasticity is thus to estimate ηl from (19) and multiply by average (1 − h)/h (see Heckman
and MaCurdy 1980, Browning et al. 1999). One problem with this approach is to measure
leisure in the data.11 Moreover, there will be a downward bias in the estimate of ηl if
borrowing constraints are binding but ignored. Finally, with the Cobb Douglas utility
function, participation constraints will bind for households with much wealth and low
wages. If participation constraints bind, equation (7) does not hold with equality and
the estimate of ηl from (19) will be biased.12 In empirical work households with no or
low labor supply are often excluded. Since ht+1 is correlated with the wage change, that
procedure may still induce a bias in the estimates.
4 Estimation on synthetic data
Tables II and III report estimation results based on the utility function speciﬁed in (10).
As the benchmark, we have used the parameter values µ =2and γ =1for the risk
aversion and labor-supply elasticity, respectively.
Table II shows results from estimations of (15) on data generated by the model. The
ﬁrst column reports regression results for the full sample, thus ignoring borrowing con-
straints captured by φ. The estimated elasticity is then 0.55 (recall that the true elasticity
is unity). To control for borrowing constraints, we excluded households that choose to
11 Heckman & MaCurdy (1980) found that the estimates for ηl (around 0.4 in their study) were not
sensitive to the assumption of total available time. However, the ratio (total time −h)/h is sensitive
to that assumption. If available time is 8760 hours (24 hours per day), the ratio is 5.5, but if instead
available time is 5000 hours, the ratio falls to 2.7. The implied labor supply elasticities are 2.2 and 1.1
respectively. According to Browning et al. (1999), the ratio is 4 and the implied Frisch elasticity is 1.6.
12 Our simulations show that participation constraints may be important. For example, estimates
of (20) are biased downwards by 15 percent. When using the diﬀerence form in (19), the bias due to
participation constraints in periods t and t +1almost cancel.
11hold no wealth. The estimate is then much closer to unity (see column 2).13 Af u r -
ther conﬁrmation that the borrowing constrained households cause the downward bias
i nt h ee s t i m a t ei se v i d e n tf r o mt h et h i r dc o lumn. Only the households with no wealth
were included in that regression, which shows a negative labor-supply response to wage
increases.
Figure 1 is useful for understanding this bias. The ﬁgure shows labor supply decisions
as a function of the current wage (productivity) and wealth.14 In a model with no bor-
rowing constraints, households would choose to work hard in periods with high wages and
to consume more leisure when wages are low. Here, however, the top lines in the ﬁgure
show that labor supply is falling in the wage rate for households with little wealth and low
wages. These households are (or are close to being) borrowing constrained. They would
consequently have to reduce consumption drastically if they did not increase labor supply
in response to falling wages. This kind of behavior is only quantitatively important for our
estimations if it is displayed by a substantial fraction of households in the economy. The
ﬁgure also plots the wealth-productivity distribution of households in the model economy.
It is clear that many households are in regions where labor supply is ﬂat or even falling
in the wage rate.
Even though our model is simplistic, it fairly well captures the correlations between
earnings and wealth, and between disposable income and wealth (0.15 and 0.29 in the
model and 0.23 and 0.32 in the data). However, the model does not exactly match the
wealth distribution observed in the data. In particular, the model generates too little
wealth inequality. The Gini coeﬃcient for wealth is 0.58 in the model and 0.78 in U.S.
13 The estimate is still less than unity because of the approximation error associated with log lineariza-
tion. The approximation bias is closely related to liquidity constraints as households with little wealth
have non-linear decision rules. Consequently, this approximation bias is negligible when only wealthy
households are included (see column 4). The Appendix shows how to separate the direct bias stemming
from liquidity constraints from the approximation bias .A c c o r d i n gt oo u rc a l c u l ations for the full-sample
estimation, the direct eﬀect accounts for 44 percent of the bias.
14 The ﬁgure only shows decision rules for households with the high ﬁxed eﬀect. Decison rules for
households with the low ﬁxed eﬀect are similar.
12data, the bottom 40 percent in the wealth distribution hold 4.8 percent of assets in the
model and 1.4 p e r c e n ti nd a t a ,a n dt h et o po n ep e r c e n th o l d6 percent in the model and
29 percent in the data (U.S. data based on Diaz-Gimenez et al. 1997). The number
of borrowing constrained households thus appears to be underpredicted by the model,
indicating that the bias we ﬁnd is not overstated.
Table III reports estimates of the semi-log speciﬁcation in equation (18). As expected,
the labor-supply elasticity is poorly estimated even when the borrowing constrained house-
holds are excluded.
The results using the Cobb-Douglas utility function (see Table IV) reconﬁrm the results
above. With our speciﬁcation, the true elasticity of leisure is 0.56, while our estimate on
the full sample is 0.43. If households with little wealth and households with low labor
supply are excluded, we obtain estimates close to the true elasticity.15
To investigate how robust the results are to our assumptions we have re-estimated
the labor-supply elasticity on data generated under various model speciﬁcations. First,
we solved the model for diﬀerent labor-supply elasticities, γ. The bias due to ignoring
borrowing constraints is around 50 percent independent of the size of the true labor
elasticity.
Second, we considered a higher coeﬃcient for risk aversion (µ =3 ). This has two
opposing eﬀects. On the one hand households hold more precautionary wealth, so fewer
households are constrained. This tends to reduce the bias. On the other hand, higher
risk aversion increases households preference for consumption smoothing, thus making
households with little wealth less willing to reduce labor supply as wages fall. In our
experiments the second eﬀect dominates, resulting in a somewhat larger bias.
Third, in real life a small fraction of households have negative net wealth (about
15 We have also ran regressions like (15) and (18) on the data generated by this model. The ﬁrst
regression yields estimates that appear related to the true elasticity, albeit clearly biased downwards.
The latter regression yields estimates far from the true elasticity. As noted in the previous section, these
regressions have no foundation in the model.
133 percent in U.S. data, see Diaz-Gimenez et al. 1997). We therefore relaxed the no-
borrowing assumption and let households borrow up to 150 percent of output per capita.
This results in fewer households being constrained but there is still a 30 percent bias in
the estimated labor-supply elasticity.
Finally, there is some disagreement as to the persistence of household productivity
shocks. We therefore solved the model with the less persistent productivity process as-
sumed in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) (ρ =0 .6 and σε =0 .24).16 With this produc-
tivity process the bias is smaller since (unrealistically) few households hold little wealth.
Moreover, much recent empirical work (see Browning et al. 1999 for a discussion and sur-
vey) rather indicates that the wage process is more persistent (possibly non-stationary)
than the process we use.
5 Estimation on PSID data
The previous sections suggest that the labor-supply elasticity should be re-estimated with
controls for borrowing constraints. To do this we need data on hours worked, wages, and
wealth. In 1984 and 1989, the PSID contained a supplement on household wealth. The
most prominent previous studies based on the PSID data set are MaCurdy (1981) and
Altonji (1986). However, MaCurdy used data from 1967 to 1976 and Altonji from 1968
to 1981. To control for liquidity, we limit our study to using data from the periods 1983
to 1985 and 1988 to 1990. In the 1984 and 1989 sample, households report asset holdings
at the time of the interview (early 1984 and 1989) and income and hours worked during
the preceding year (1983 and 1988). For example, we obtain h83, w∗
83, w∗∗
83, a84,a n ds o m e
household characteristics from the 1984 sample. The ﬁrst wage measure, w∗,i sc a l c u l a t e d
as the household head’s total labor income divided by total hours worked. The second
16 Their process was based on estimates in Heaton and Lucas (1996).
14wage measure, w∗∗, is the reported hourly wage rate, which is only available for hourly
rated workers. Wealth is measured as the net amount of liquid assets (bank accounts plus
bonds and stocks minus ‘other debts’).17
Note that, while the model makes no distinction between diﬀerent forms of wealth, we
use net liquid assets as the wealth measure. A large fraction of total wealth is housing
(52 percent in our sample). A house is an illiquid asset with large transaction costs that
limit its use in smoothing consumption. Angeletos et al. (2001) also show that within an
overlapping generations economy, households use liquid wealth to buﬀer income shocks,
and typically sell all their illiquid wealth in one transaction after age 70. This suggests
that we should use liquid wealth rather than total wealth.
We use the same sample selection criteria as Altonji and consider men that are house-
hold heads and between the age 25 and 60.18 Assets and wages are deﬂated to 1983
prices using CPI. Moreover, observations are treated as missing if hours worked are zero
or exceed 4860, or if hours or wages change by a factor 2.5 or more. Further, we ex-
clude individuals whose marital status has changed, or whose wife or main cohabitor has
changed.
To estimate the Frisch elasticity γ, we follow Altonji and consider the diﬀerence spec-
iﬁcation,
∆lnht+1 = constant + γ∆lnw
∗
t+1 − ξt+1 (21)
where we instrument for ∆lnw∗
t+1 using ∆lnw∗∗
t and lnw∗∗
t . The reason for using lagged
w∗∗ rather than lagged w∗ as instruments is to avoid a bias implied by measurement errors
in the wage data (see Altonji for a further discussion).
The ﬁrst stage regression is estimated as
17 ‘Other debts’ mostly consists of credit card charges, student loans, medical or legal bills, and loans
from relatives.
18 Altonji only considered married men. Because we are restricted to using data from two years only,
we have few observations in our sample and we see no reason to exclude non-married men. Furthermore,
the results are not very sensitive with respect to this sample criteria, see below. MaCurdy used similar
selection criteria but limits his study to ages 25 to 57.
15∆lnw∗




R2 =0 .03 F =1 1 .6 n =6 9 7
(22)
The low R2 value and high F value show that lagged wages have little but signiﬁcant
explanatory power for future wages.19
Table V reports results of the second stage regression. The ﬁrst column reports regres-
sion results for the full sample, thus ignoring borrowing constraints captured by φ.T h e
estimated elasticity is then 0.07 which is close to what Altonji found when using these
instruments (see his table 1, columns 5-8).20
We cannot directly observe who is borrowing constraint in the data. Arguably, a house-
hold with little liquid wealth relative to historical income is likely to be constrained. Our
preferred indicator of borrowing constraints is liquid wealth being less than one monthly
income, but we also use other cut-oﬀ levels, wealth in absolute levels, and total instead
of liquid wealth. Column 4 in Table V presents the results for our preferred speciﬁcation.
It shows that the estimated elasticity increases to 0.42 when liquidity constrained house-
holds are excluded from the sample. The results are robust to other indicators using liquid
wealth (see columns 2, 3 and 5). If we instead control for borrowing constraints using
total wealth, the results are qualitatively the same though quantitatively not as striking
(see columns 6-9). This is what our previous discussion suggested. The standard errors
for the estimated elasticities are large and the diﬀerences between the diﬀerent estimates
are not signiﬁcant.
Most previous studies have only considered married men. To investigate the sensitivity
of this sample criteria we have estimated the labor supply elasticity excluding unmarried
men from our sample. The estimated elasticities for married men are somewhat smaller
19 The R2 is similar to Altonji’s and the parameter estimates have the same signs as his.
20 The reported regression corresponds to Altonji’s column 5. We have also included age and year
dummies as in Altonji’s columns 6-8, and the results are unchanged.
16than for all men, but they are also estimated with a substantial downward bias (see Table
VI columns 1-3).
We have also estimated the labor-supply elasticity including all households in the
PSID, not just the original (representative) SRC sample. Comparing Tables V and VI we
see that the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these households.
MaCurdy and, in some speciﬁcations, Altonji used various household characteristics
as instruments for future wages changes. To investigate the sensitivity of our results
to the choice of instruments we have also, estimated the labor-supply elasticity using
year dummies, age, age2, education, education2,a g e ×education, and age×education2 as
instruments. The results are presented in Table VII. Since we now do not use w∗∗ as an
instrument we can include households that do not report hourly wages. When we restrict
the attention to the hourly rated workers, the ﬁrst stage regressions are not signiﬁcant
(these results are not reported). When we do not control for the presence of borrowing
constraints, the estimated elasticity is 0.30. The magnitudes of our estimated parameter
values and standard errors in the are similar to those estimated by MaCurdy and Altonji.21
When using liquid wealth to control for borrowing constraints our estimated elasticity falls
to 0.24 (but when using total wealth, the estimate is 0.40). When including the non-SRC
households, the elasticity is 0.46 in the full sample, and increases to 0.56 when we control
for borrowing constraints using liquid wealth.22 It should be emphasized (as also Altonji
remarks), that the ﬁrst stage regression has little explanatory power when only household
characteristics are used as instruments for the wage change. The results in the second
stage are therefore unreliable.
In our discussion of non-separable utility functions we concluded that, at least if utility
21 MaCurdy’s estimate of the elasticity is 0.23 with a standard error of 0.10 in the speciﬁcation most
similar to ours (his table 1, row 1). Altonji’s estimate when instrumenting with household characteristics
is 0.28 with a standard error of 0.13.
22 We have ran the same regressions for married men, but the ﬁrst-stage equations are not signiﬁcant
and the results are not reported.
17takes the Cobb Douglas form, the appropriate method for obtaining an estimate of the
labor supply elasticity is to ﬁrst estimate the leisure elasticity ηl from equation (19). Our
estimates of ηl have the same pattern as, and are consistent with, the estimated labor-
supply elasticities reported in Table V. For example, when we assume that total time is
5000 hours in a year, the estimated ηl is 0.18 in the full sample, and 0.30 when controlling
for liquid wealth. To convert these values into labor supply elasticities, we multiply by
1.25,w h i c hi st h ea v e r a g eo f(5000 − H)/H. Interestingly, and contrary to Heckman and
MaCurdy (1980), our implied estimates of the labor-supply elasticity are not sensitive to
the assumption about the total available time.
6 Concluding remarks
We have argued that labor-supply estimates will be biased downward if liquidity con-
straints are ignored. By using standard econometric methods on simulated data, we have
also demonstrated that this bias may be substantial. Finally, using PSID data on male
labor supply we estimate higher elasticities when workers with little liquid wealth are
excluded from the sample.
There is a vast literature trying to estimate the labor-supply elasticity with diﬀerent
methods, using diﬀerent data sets, and obtaining a variety of estimates. We have chosen to
contrast our results to MaCurdy’s (1981) and Altonji’s (1986) because they used the PSID
data set which occasionally contains detailed wealth data, and because their papers were
the ﬁrst, and still are among the few, that explicitly focus on the intertemporal elasticity
(rather than on some static elasticity). Our study suggests that allowing for liquidity
constraints in other empirical frameworks could further enhance our understanding of the
labor-supply elasticity.
18Appendix A Log-linearization and approximation bias
This appendix demonstrates how the log-linearization of the Euler equation (8) may create
an additional bias.
Assuming rational expectations, the realized marginal utility is equal to the expected
marginal utility plus a mean-zero forecast error ε,
λt+1 =E tλt+1 + εt+1.
The Euler equation is then
λt − φt = β (1 + r)(λt+1 − εt+1).
Take logs and use a ﬁrst order linear approximation on the left hand side and a second















We obtained equation (13) by deﬁning ξt+1 ≡ εt+1/λt+1, and by assuming that ξ
2 is
small. If we do not ignore the second order term, equation (14) is









A bias in estimates of γ b a s e do ne q u a t i o n( 1 5 )c a na r i s ee i t h e rb e c a u s eo fb o r r o w i n g
constraints (φ ignored) or because of the approximation error (ξ
2 ignored). Using our
synthetic data, we can account for the sources of the bias.
It is straightforward to calculate simulated values for the marginal utility of consump-
tion, λt, using simulated consumption data. We calculate the marginal utility of borrowing
as a function of the household’s state variables, Φ(e,a) as λ − β (1 + r)E(λ
0|e,a) using
the household’s decision rules. We use simulated data on e and a to generate φ (we use
23 We have checked numerically that higher order terms of φ and ε are of little importance.
19linear approximations between grid points in Φ). The forecast errors ε are then calculated
as λ
0 − (λ − φ)/[β (1 + r)].
In practice when estimating (15), we instrument for the productivity change ∆lnet+1
with its expected value. Therefore, we also instrument for ξ
2
t+1 by regressing simulated
ξ
2
t+1 on information available at date t.
Let ˆ γ denote the estimate of γ based on equation (15). We then see that














By calculating these moments on the simulated data, we account for the sources of the
bias in ˆ γ.
With the Cobb-Douglas utility function one also needs to allow for participation con-
straints in (19). Similar calculations result in








































In our simulations, the last two terms in the above equation tend to cancel.
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δ 0.075 Separable utility Cobb Douglas utility
θ 0.300 µ 2.00 3.56




Note: The parameter µ has been chosen so that the degree of risk aversion for consumption ﬂuctuations
is 2, and α is chosen so that average labor supply is approximately 0.33.
Table II
Labor supply estimates, separable utility and synthetic data
sample: households with assets, at+1, belonging to
[0,∞)( 0 ,∞)[ 0 ,0.1¯ a)[ ¯ a,∞)
ϕ 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆lne 0.55 0.89 −0.12 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.10 0.19 0.01 0.13
# obs. 199400 169849 54635 66452
Note: This table shows results from estimation of ∆lnht+1 = ϕ+γ∆lnet+1 −ξt+1 using Et∆lnet+1 as
instrument. Standard errors in parenthesis.
24Table III
Separable utility and synthetic data: semi-log speciﬁcation
sample: households with assets, at+1, belonging to
[0,∞)( 0 ,∞)[ 0 ,0.1¯ a)[ ¯ a,∞)
ϕ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆lne 0.16 0.27 −0.07 0.26
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.08 0.21 0.01 0.15
# obs. 199400 169849 54635 66452
Note: This table shows results from estimation of ∆ht+1 = ϕ + γ∆lnet+1 − ξt+1 using Et∆lnet+1 as
instrument. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table IV
Cobb Douglas utility and synthetic data: estimates of ηl
sample: households with assets, at+1, belonging to
[0,∞)( 0 ,∞)[ 0 ,0.1¯ a)[ ¯ a,∞)
ϕ 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆lne 0.43 0.50 0.22 0.54
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
R2 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.09
# obs. 199400 182763 40046 66318
Note: This table shows results from estimation of ∆(1−ht+1)=ϕ−ηl∆lnet+1 −ξt+1 using Et∆lnet+1
as instruments The true ηl is 0.561. Non-working households have been excluded in all regressions.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
25Table V
Labor supply estimates and PSID data
sample: wealth criterion
no liquid assets > total wealth >
0 1
2im im $1,000 0 1
2iy iy $12,000
ϕ −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
∆lnw∗ 0.07 0.33 0.37 0.42 0.33 0.03 0.16 0.28 −0.17
(0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.19) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-stat 0.12 2.46 2.53 2.92 1.76 0.02 0.53 1.48 0.64
# obs. 697 483 400 346 373 665 524 442 508
Note: This table shows results from estimation of ∆lnht+1 = ϕ + γ∆lnw∗
t+1 − ξt+1. ∆lnw∗
t+1 was
instrumented for using equation (21) and estimated as (22). im = 160w∗
t represents one monthly income
and iy = 1920w∗
t represents one yearly income. Standard errors in parenthesis.
26Table VI
Labor supply estimates and PSID data: other samples
Married yes no yes
Representative yes no no
1st stage R2 0.04 0.03 0.05
1st stage F-stat 13.53 21.72 27.34
wealth criterion
no liquid total no liquid total no liquid total
∆lnw∗ −0.04 0.19 0.23 0.05 0.28 0.38 −0.02 0.05 0.23
(0.18) (0.24) (0.21) (0.13) (0.19) (0.16) (0.11) (0.17) (0.14)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-stat 0.06 0.63 1.26 0.15 2.33 5.46 0.03 0.09 2.72
# obs. 606 310 410 1338 556 757 1132 484 690
Note: This table shows results from estimation of ∆lnht+1 = ϕ + γ∆lnw∗
t+1 − ξt+1. The estimated
constant term is not reported. ‘Married’ indicates that only married men are included. ‘Representative’
indicates that only households stemming from the original (representative) SRC sample are included.
∆lnw∗
t+1 was instrumented for using equation (21). The number of observations in the ﬁrst-stage re-
gression is equal to the number of observations in the sample with no wealth criterion. The test criterion
for liquid wealth is one monthly income and the test criterion for total wealth is one yearly income (see
Table V for deﬁnitions). Standard errors in parenthesis.
27Table VII
Labor supply estimates and PSID data: other instrument
Representative yes no
1st stage R2 0.01 0.00
1st stage F-stat 2.81 2.02
wealth criterion
no liquid total no liquid total
∆lnw∗ 0.30 0.24 0.40 0.46 0.56 0.62
(0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.22) (0.22)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-stat 3.78 1.67 4.68 6.72 6.22 8.09
# obs. 2248 1361 1574 3596 1867 2248
Note: This table shows results from estimation of ∆lnht+1 = ϕ + γ∆lnw∗
t+1 − ξt+1. The estimated
constant term is not reported. ‘Representative’ indicates that only households stemming from the original
(representative) SRC sample are included. ∆lnw∗
t+1 was instrumented for using year dummies, age, age2,
education, education2, age×education, and age×education2. The number of observations in the ﬁrst-stage
regression is equal to the number of observations in the sample with no wealth criterion. The test criterion
for liquid wealth is one monthly income and the test criterion for total wealth is one yearly income (see
Table V for deﬁnitions). Standard errors in parenthesis.
























Figure 1: Decision rules for labor supply and distribution of households
The diﬀerent lines represent labor supply decision rules for individuals with diﬀerent
wealth levels. Wealth increases from top to bottom. The top line shows labor supply
decisions as a function of the idiosyncratic wage for a household with no wealth. The
bottom line shows decision rules for a household with asset holdings three times as high
as average asset holdings. The ﬁgure only displays decision rules for a few selected wealth
levels. The dots indicate wage and labor combinations for a subsample of the simulated
data.
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